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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The policy 47 of the statute which authorizes the setting of the tariff rates is
to provide reasonable rates without unjust discrimination against any shippers, and
therefore no variance from the traiff schedules is allowed.48 The Appellate Division,49 in holding the additional charges applicable, used an "imaginary line" test,
saying that once the carrier passed through any door he was removing goods from

the interior of the building. However here the provisions of the tariff were
ambiguous50 so that evidence that the customary practice of carriers who dealt
with the plaintiff did not make this charge, was helpful in resolving the ambiguity0 ' and was not a changing of the legal rates set out in the tariff. "Where the
52
meaning is doubtful, such provisions are to be construed in favor of the shipper."
Moreover, the reason for the distinction in the tariff was to compensate a carrier
for extra work involved in extra handling, and since here the loading of the carrier

could be done in one operation, the justification for the extra charge did not exist.
The Court's use of a reasonableness test in its interpretation of the tariff

brings about a more equitable result, although the imaginary line test of the

Appellate Division would be much simpler in its practical application in future
dealings between carriers and shippers. In any event, the entire problem can be
resolved by more explicit language in future tariffs.
Unfair Competition-Similarify of Names
In Playland Holding Corp. v.Playland Center, Inc.,53 plaintiff moved for a
summary proceeding pursuant to Section 964 of the N. Y. Penal Law to enjoin
47. N. Y. PUB. SERv. LAw §63(i) 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of
this state to regulate transportation by motor carriers in such manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, and foster sound economic
conditions in such transportation and among such carriers in the public interest;
promote adequate, economical, and efficient service by motor carriers, and reasonable charges therefor, without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or
advantages, and unfair or destructive competitive practices ....
48. N. Y. PUB. SERV. LAw §63(t) 2. No common carrier by motor vehicle
shall charge or demand or collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for transportation or for any service in connection therewith between
the points enumerated in such tariff than the rates, tolls and charges specified In
the tariffs in effect at the time....
49. 284 App. Div. 709, 134 N. Y. S. 2d 495 (4th Dep't 1954).
50. See note 46 supra. Paragraph (b) seems to uphold the interpretation of
the carrier, whereas paragraph (e) seems to agree with the shipper's Interpretation.
51. New York Cent. & Hudson River 1. R. v. General Electric Co., 219 N. Y.
227, 114 N. E. 115 (1916); MCKINNEY'S STATUTES, book 1 §128, Practical Construction. . . . General Usage, long continued and therefore unquestioned, has
much the weight of judicial decision and should not be lightly disregarded....
Thus in -a doubtful case a construction placed upon a statute by the parties
affected, and acquiesed in for a long period, will be followed by the court....
When a freight tariff is properly filed and published it has the force and effect
of a statute and is often so treated for purposes of construction. Updike Grain
Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 35 F. 2d 486 (8th Cir. 1929).
52. 9 AM. JuR., Carriers §144 (1937); United States v. Gulf Refining Co., 268
U. S. 542 (1924).
53 1 N. Y. 2d 300, 135 N. E. 2d 202 (1956).

COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
defendant, Playland Center, Inc., from using in its amusement park business the
name "Playland" and the symbol of a down's head when advertising such business.54 Affidavits presented by plaintiff to support such summary proceeding
showed that through long use and extensive advertising a secondary meaning had
attached to, and identified plaintiff with, such name and symbol; and further
showed that defendant had operated his amusement park for a short time dose
to, and on a main artery to, plaintiff's park with intent to deceive and with
resultant deception of the public. Defendant denied an intent to deceive the public
and also contended that the name "Playland" and the clown's head were in such
general use as not to permit a first user the exclusive right to appropriate them.
The Court, reversing the Appellate Division,55 reentered the injunction, holding
unanimously that the evidence sustained the trial court's finding5 6 of respondent's
guilty intent in using the name and the probability of deception.
A person or corporation who, with intent to deceive, uses a name in advertising which has a probability of deceiving the public as to the party using it,
violates Section 964 of the N. Y. Penal Law. This Statute provides as one remedy
a special summary proceeding for an injunction which may be decided on affidavits
alone.
Since the proceeding involved is summary in nature, the right to injunctive
relief must be clearly established; 57 however, mere denial of intent to deceive
the public does not establish a true issue of fact requiring a trial and the taking
of proof for its resolution. Consequently it will be insufficient in and of itself to
defeat the summary proceeding.58 The requisite intent may adequately be ascertained from the objective facts and it is sufficiently shown if there be conclusive
evidence of intent to deceive. 59 The Court felt that the circumstances described in
plaintiff's affidavits inferred such intent and therefore became conclusive evidence
since defendant did not deny the facts, but merely the intent.
To satisfy the Section it is unnecessary for the plaintiff to show that any
person has actually been deceived, probability of deception being enough. 60 Secondary meaning may attach to common words so that in a particular locality
54. Julius Restaurant, Inc. v. Lombardi, 282 N. Y. 126, 25 N. E. 2d 874
(1940); Under §964 of the N. Y. PENAL LAW, a proceeding may be instituted by

a notice of motion on a verified petition for an order enjoining the use of a
trade name with intent to deceive or mislead the public.
55. 285 App. Div. 1075, 139 N. Y. S. 2d 744 (2d Dep't 1955).
56. 206 Misc. 404, 133 N. Y. S. 2d 7 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
57. Association of Contracting Plumbers of New York v. Contracting
Plumbers Ass'n of Brooklyn
Queens, 302 N. Y. 495, 99 N. E. 2d 542 (1951).
58. Industrial Plants Corp. v. Industrial Liquidating Co., 286 App. Div.
568, 146 N. Y. S. 2d 2 (1st Dep't 1955).
59. Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Layco Auto Seat Cover Center, Inc., 205 Misc. 827,
130 N. Y. S. 2d 108 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
60. Hirsch v.. Perlnan, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 10 (1944), aff'd., 268 App. Div. 1035,
52 N. Y. S. 2d 691 (1st Dep't 1945).
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they come to be associated solely with a particular business or product."1 The
Court held it was probable that, because of the extensive advertising and long
period of doing business, secondary meaning had attached to the words and symbol
in issue and were understood in the locality involved to refer solely to plaintiff's
business; thus there was a probability of resultant deception.
In reaching the particular conclusions as to intent and probability of deception, the Court acted correctly, for no other conclusions could reasonably be
inferred from the facts presented in plaintiff's affidavits.
Workmen's Compensafion-Non-Scheduled Adjusfmenfs
A lump sum non-scheduled adjustment of future compensation as provided
for under section 15 (5-b) of the Workmen's Compensation Law0 2 is binding
on neither the employer nor the employee until it has been approved by the
63
Workmen's Compensation Board.
In Zielinski v. General Motors Corporatiop,64 the question arose as to when
such approval may be considered to have been rendered. The employer and
the employee had made such an agreement and upon application to the Workmen's Compensation Board, "tentative" approval was obtained. Prior to the issuance of a written opinion, the employee died. The employer, unaware of this
fact, sent a check to the deceased employee for the amount of the agreed adjustment upon receipt of the Board's approval. The deceased employee's wife, as
administratrix, deposited the check to the account of the estate. In this action
of interpleader, 5 wherein both the employer and the administratrix claimed
the right to the funds, the Court held (4-3), reversing the Appellate Division,60
that the deceased employee's estate had no right to the proceeds of the check.
Though a wife can recover any compensation due her husband at the time
of his death,6 7 it is an elementary principle that the estate of a deceased person
61. G. c C. Merrison Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed, 369 (6th Cir. 1912), aff'd.
and modified, 238 Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 243 U. S. 651 (1917).
62. N. Y. WORKIMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §15 (5-b). Non-scheduled Adjustments. . . . The board may, in the interests of justice, approve a non-schedule
adjustment agreed to between the claimant and the employer or his Insurance

carrier.

63. Dodson v. Healy Co., 275 App. Div. 130, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 410 (3d Dep't 1949),
leave to appeal den., 300 N. Y. 760, 88 N. E. 2d 534 (1949).
64. 1 N. Y. 2d 424, 135 N. E. 2d 808 (1956).
65. N. Y.Civ. PRAc. Acr §285; A bank may maintain interpleader where the
controversy is with respect to a deposit. Herpe v. Herpe, 225 N. Y. 323, 122 N. E.
204 (1919).
66. Zielinski v. General Motors Corporation, 285 App. Div. 407, 143 N. Y. S.
2d 228 (4th Dep't 1955).
67.

N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §33.... (I)n the case of the death

of an injured employee to whom there was due at the time of his or her death
any compensation under the provisions of this chapter, the amount of such compensation shall be payable to the surviving wife or husband....
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